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War as Political Work
Using Social Science for 
Strategic Success
Mathew J. Schmidt, Ph.D.
Dr. Mathew J. Schmidt is an asistant profesor of national security and political science at the University of New 
Haven. Previously he taught at the School of Advanced Military Studies. He holds a Ph.D. in government from 
Georgetown University. In 2012, Fas Company Magazine placed him 22nd on its list of the 100 most creative people in 
busines, for his work bridging public- and private-sector approaches to strategic thinking and planning.
Tis article is based on a report originaly writen for 
the Army Research Institute’s 2011 Strategic Tinking 
Initiative Conference.War is not just about defeating the enemy. War is about creating social and political order when past systems of order have 
disintegrated or been broken down intentionaly by the 
use of military force. Good military strategy demands 
that the role of enemy forces be considered within the 
context of the larger social and political order, and its 
failure. Sound operational planning depends on this.
Defeating an enemy force is not the strategic aim 
of any war. Te strategic aim should be to recreate 
a stable order that can be sustained without major 
ongoing military participation from the batlefeld 
victor. Defeating enemies militarily is merely the pre-
requisite to strategic victory, not its conclusion. Real 
war, of course, is complicated because the end of a war 
is not the end of the strategic task. Te way in which 
batlefeld “victories” are achieved can quickly doom 
the probabilities for strategic success. Vietnam and 
Iraq are only two examples of this; military history is 
litered with others.
U.S. Army soldiers discuss 
the plan of movement for 
a patrol through Petawa 
Vilage, Parwan Province, 
Afghanistan, 13 June 2014.
(U.S. Army photo by Cpl. George Huley)
51MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2014
STRATEGIC SUCCESS
Military victory merely sets the conditions for the 
transformative social and political order that come 
after the guns go quiet. For better or worse, the job of 
winning the victory always falls to the military. There 
are not, nor have there ever been, State Department 
divisions parachuting in to do the “political” work of 
securing the victory. This is a false dichotomy. War is 
political work. Militaries—armies especially—are tools 
used to do the fundamental work of politics. They use 
force to determine which side gets to decide the key 
questions of social and political order when the normal 
structures for determining order have ceased to work.
War demands a qualitative mindset because war 
is a social phenomenon. Military commanders need 
to understand politics in a deep and systematic way if 
they are to ensure military force is a successful strategic 
tool. They need to think strategically about the ulti-
mate aims the force under their control will support. 
The way to do this is to begin to think in context, to put 
the role of force in context with the other variables on 
the battlefield. To think in context systematically, com-
manders need to buttress their ability to think qualita-
tively and use the methods of social science to approach 
military questions.
Strategic thinking involves evaluating “political, 
economic, psychological, and military forces [i.e., influ-
ences]” to ensure military operations support national 
policies.1 These types of “forces” have a common char-
acteristic: they do not lend themselves to quantitative 
analysis. Army professionals who wish to practice 
strategic thinking will need to adopt a qualitative 
approach to evaluating such factors. This is more easily 
said than done because qualitative analysis is unnatural 
to Army culture.
The study of political science, economics, psychology, 
and military science requires grounding in qualitative 
social science methodology. While this methodology is 
essential to effective strategic thinking, it is contrary to 
the Army’s dominant professional culture. Army culture 
prefers a techno-scientific, quantitative, and predictive 
approach based on mathematical-type analysis; that 
approach cannot provide an accurate understanding of 
strategic issues, let alone predict outcomes of military 
operations with anything close to certainty.
Contemporary social science studies social phenom-
ena in terms of interdependent—rather than indepen-
dent and dependent—variables. For phenomena that 
are made up of interdependent variables—phenom-
ena such as war—establishing clear cause-and-effect 
theories is frustrating even for social scientists accus-
tomed to that type of research. In fact, interdependent 
variables make predictions of the hard-science type im-
possible. This does not mean, however, that qualitative 
approaches should be dismissed. Rather, understanding 
the value and limitations of qualitative methods is 
crucial for a profession tasked with using force to create 
qualitative sociopolitical end states.
What is the Problem?
Quantitative approaches work best when re-
searchers can isolate individual problems and when 
relationships are hierarchical. A complex military 
problem, such as “how do we invade Region X and 
establish security?” provides a simplified example. The 
problem-solving process typically used is quantitative 
and predictive. It starts with a defined highest-order 
problem (invading Region X and establishing security) 
and breaks it down into smaller problems such as—
• How would we get there?
• How long would a trip by boat or plane take?
• How many weapons and supplies would we need?
• What kind of weapons and supplies would we need?
A reductive approach is then used along with the 
analytical tools of mathematics and statistics in a re-
peating process until a series of answers can be summed 
together to solve the original problem.
Strategic problems, on the other hand, are not really 
“problems” at all; they are metaproblems. Strategic ques-
tions ask about intent and values; they are questions 
about choosing an explanatory framework to use when 
addressing problems of application. Strategic problems 
have only qualitative answers. Rather than ask, “How do 
we invade Region X,” a strategic question seeks to under-
stand why or whether invading Region X would indeed 
help achieve larger goals and whether its negative ripple 
effects over time might outweigh its short-term benefits. 
Strategic questions are first-order questions:
• Should we invade Region X, considering all the 
potential consequences?
• What would we expect an invasion to achieve?
• In what other ways could we achieve our goals 
(e.g., such as by bombing alone)?
• Should we also seek the dissolution of the region’s 
monarchy or ruling system?2
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These are not the types of questions any military 
organization encourages commanders and staffs to ask 
(publically, at least). Instead, most military organiza-
tions proceed on the assumption that civilian policy-
makers already will have connected the dots between 
strategic intent and military capability. History shows 
repeatedly how wrong such assumptions can be. Still, 
such questions are fundamental to planning because 
they probe strategic aim: What change in the military 
and political context would a series of military oper-
ations ultimately achieve? Put another way, strategic 
questions look for answers to similar metaquestions: 
What is the qualitative change in conditions (e.g., 
destruction of the war-making capability of Region 
X) that war plans should achieve, and how well would 
those changed conditions support national strategic 
goals? This is especially important for military leaders 
to ask when national goals seem unclear or clearly in 
excess of what military force can do at acceptable cost 
in time, blood, and money.
What is a Qualitative Approach?
Qualitative approaches can be understood by 
their function and their form. First, the function 
of qualitative research is to interpret context—the 
interrelated conditions in which something exists or 
occurs.3 To interpret context means to understand 
conditions within a cohesive whole. Any categoriza-
tion of conditions—including any statistical analysis, 
if appropriate—would be based on their relationship 
to the whole. Second, the basic form of all qualitative 
research is the gathering or developing of what could 
be called “texts”—referring to spoken and written 
language—because reading and conducting inter-
views are the primary means of obtaining data and 
information. Qualitative researchers gather existing 
texts from archives, memoirs, and other sources, or 
they generate texts through interviews and interro-
gations or derivative methods such as focus groups or 
surveys.4 To interpret a subject’s utterances during an 
interview or understand an archived memorandum, 
the researcher would need sufficient training in the 
appropriate language and culture.
During a 2012 lecture at Duke University, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin E. 
Dempsey, discussing his experience in strategic decision 
making, emphasized the significance of context:
When I go into a meeting to discuss policy, 
discuss strategy, discuss operations, plans, 
whatever it happens to be, he who has the 
best context generally prevails in the ar-
gument, not necessarily who’s got the best 
facts. There’s a difference. It’s who has the 
best context in which those facts exist.5
Context differentiates a qualitative from quantita-
tive way of seeing the world. By thinking in context—
using qualitative approaches—commanders will be 
better able to set the on-the-ground conditions they 
are asked to establish. Not being an adept partner in 
strategic discussions that include context is a guarantee 
of military misfortune.
Why is a Qualitative Approach 
Needed Now?
The modern American military tradition is tech-
no-scientific to the extreme. In practice, this means the 
American tradition is defined chiefly by what Antoine 
Bousquet calls “systemic application of science and 
technology,” as a way to gain “complete predictabili-
ty and centralized control over armed conflict…”6 In 
the Army, this pattern became exaggerated after the 
Vietnam War. Gen. William DePuy, founder of the 
Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 
sought to refocus the new all-volunteer force toward 
what he saw as a future war dominated by techno-
logically skilled teams operating advanced weapons 
systems as efficiently as they would a lawn mower.7 In 
the 1990s, the debate over what was known as the “rev-
olution in military affairs” trod similar ground.8
DePuy sought tactical superiority through system-
atized training and the development of generalized, 
quasi-scientific rules and methods for battle. These 
rules and methods would maximize the chance of 
success in any engagement by minimizing the risk of 
not maintaining control of the situation. This approach 
would reduce tactical engagements to predictable 
events in which basic variables (on-fire rates, weapons 
performance, mobility, and so on) could be controlled 
reasonably well. Crucially, the guiding tactical princi-
ples were regarded as valid in a predictive, hard-sci-
entific sense. Mission accomplishment surely would 
follow their application. This was only possible, though, 
because the nature of the imagined war against the 
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Soviets was apolitical—it was a fantasy war at the end 
of history. The winner would survive; the loser’s society 
would be annihilated. All the annoying questions of 
sociopolitical context were excluded from the scenario.
Therefore, during operations, neither tactical 
principles nor tactical aims would be questioned even 
though tactical principles left room for applying judg-
ment. The relatively consistent tactical successes of 
U.S. forces, especially since the 1970s, provided proof. 
Consistent application of position, cover, fires, com-
munication, and so on, led to successful operations. 
The sum of all this experience reinforced the idea that 
a quantitative approach produced tactical success. 
Tactical success became an end in itself, separate from 
the uncomfortable complexities of war as politics in 
extremis. Military science increasingly came to be seen, 
erroneously, as a scientific branch of the hard sciences. 
It had become no more than quasi-scientific at best, 
pseudoscientific at worst.
The problems of war and warfare, in reality, are 
not quantifiable problems of the hard sciences because 
they involve the behavior of human beings. As Nobel 
Prize-winning physicist Steven Weinberg noted, “It 
has been an essential element in 
the success of science to distinguish 
those problems that are and are not 
illuminated by taking human be-
ings into account.”9 Social scientists 
seek to understand and explain 
why people do things. Students of 
warfare using a qualitative ap-
proach would seek to understand 
why people started wars, ended 
wars, and prosecuted wars in 
certain ways and at certain times. 
Answering any of these questions 
would involve getting at the subjec-
tive motivations of kings, generals, 
soldiers, and civilians. The ongoing 
difficulty is creating a reasonably 
objective science of fundamentally 
subjective phenomena. Military 
commanders need to see their 
lifelong professional role as active 
participants in the effort to build 
the discipline of war studies as a 
social science.
What is the Function of Time?
All social science questions involve time as an inter-
dependent variable. L.P. Hartley’s now aphoristic line, 
“The past is a foreign country,” is but one illustration of 
why time makes cause and effect questions so com-
plicated and difficult to answer.10 Explaining complex 
events such as warfare in the kind of out-of-time rules 
used in hard science is impossible. In hard science, 
rules are rules because they nearly always explain and 
predict things that happen. On the other hand, answer-
ing why the Hundred Years War happened is not the 
same as explaining why Vietnam happened. Whatever 
the broad similarities, the differences from one case to 
another tend to be greater.
The United States surged 30,000 troops into 
Afghanistan in 2008 based largely on military argu-
ments that a successful surge into Iraq in 2006 would 
predict a successful surge in Afghanistan. One problem 
with this way of thinking was that it assumed simi-
lar conditions in each state. In reality, the differences 
between the societies in Iraq and Afghanistan were 
considerable according to analysts Rick Nelson, Nathan 
Freier, and Maren Leed.11 Neither the problems nor 
Afghan National Army special forces and commandos, 6th Special Operations Kandak, 
prepare to clear a series of compounds during an operation in the Nejrab District, Kapisa 
Province, Afghanistan, 27 May 2014. ANASF, assisted by USSF, conducted the operation 
to disrupt insurgent freedom of maneuver in the area.
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the strategic aims were similar across these states. 
Another problem was that researchers would need at 
least 10 years to develop a qualitative analysis of the 
surge in Iraq—to identify the critical variables and 
understand the cause-and-effect relationships and in-
teractions. However, action in Afghanistan in 2008 had 
to be taken quickly.
In 2008, the surge in Iraq had not been analyzed 
sufficiently to establish generalizations—quantitative or 
qualitative—about why it worked or why a similar action 
might work elsewhere. What about that surge might have 
caused a drop in violence? Was it the number of troops, 
the population density of the key neighborhoods, or any 
of the hundreds of techniques individual commands 
used? Military operational researchers have the statistical 
background to run complex regression analyses to attack 
such questions. They mostly lack the grounding in theory 
needed to put those analyses into a historically validat-
ed framework that could provide contextual input to a 
commander’s decision-making process. In other words, 
military operational research specialists will struggle 
to see subsurface historical and social differences when 
comparing societies with which they are unfamiliar.
Frustration with a qualitative approach is under-
standable because of the time it can take. A desire for 
predictability is understandable as well. However, the 
idea that quantitative analysis, even when it does take 
less time, will predict the outcomes of military actions 
is an illusion—especially if outcomes are to be consid-
ered beyond a given mission or operation. Moreover, a 
quantitative analysis is faster only when it is limited to 
analyzing the accomplishment of a given mission at a 
given time—which is not the same as strategic thinking.
One common English definition of strategy is “a 
careful plan or method for achieving a particular goal 
usually over a long period of time.”12 Any definition 
of strategy is based on aligning present decisions with 
an idea about a desired future. Strategic thinking is 
about “thinking in time,” and thinking in time is about 
thinking in terms of the interrelated nature of variables 
across time—about context.
What is the Real Question?
Decision makers who think strategically will try to 
understand qualitative changes in complex political, 
economic, psychological, and military contexts. A 
qualitative approach to strategic 
thought is concerned with de-
scribing the values and interests 
of legitimate social groups and 
ensuring those values and interests 
are represented in public deci-
sion-making processes. According 
to Bent Flyvbjerg, this helps 
ensure “due diligence” in the public 
realm.13 Flyvbjerg argues that 
understanding values and inter-
ests is at the core of the qualitative 
approach to science. Furthermore, 
in this sense there is no static state 
called victory against which prog-
ress can be quantitatively mea-
sured. Rather, strategic thinkers 
must continually make judgments 
about the qualitative changes they 
are charged with affecting.14 Those 
changes, of course, reflect the 
values and interests of people and 
institutions in the public realm. 
As people and institutions change 
First Lt. Timothy Robberstad, platoon leader for 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, 1st Battal-
ion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Inf. Division, receives guid-
ance from local elders and leaders from the Afghan National Defense Service outside a 
polling site in the Dand District of Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, 11 June 2014.
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or the rank order of values and interests changes, 
the strategic proposition itself changes. Victory is a 
changeling mirroring the shifts in values and interests 
of those who have the power to define it.
Moreover, because the nature of strategic thought 
requires thinking about systemic (interrelated) condi-
tions over time, quantitative measures are of limited 
use. Most important, strategic thinking is less a discrete 
activity than a habit. Developing the habit of thinking 
strategically after assimilating a professional culture 
focused on quantitative measures of tactical proficiency 
is extraordinarily difficult.
This is not to say that quantitative measurement 
does not have its place in military science. There are 
good reasons quantitative measures are preferred in 
the military. Skills such as hitting a target with a bullet 
decisively and repeatedly are properly assessed with 
quantitative measures. As soldiers advance in their 
Army careers, the dominant evaluation method they 
are exposed to is quantitative. The issue for leaders and 
planners is knowing which approaches to evaluation 
suit each situation. Each approach represents a differ-
ent way of knowing about the world; neither is perfect 
or foolproof. The quantitative approach supports stra-
tegic thought but is not sufficient to ignite or sustain it.
When making decisions, commanders frame 
questions as problems to be solved. This is the language 
of quantitative algebra. Let us suppose that to counter 
a certain threat, U.S. forces were considering invad-
ing Country Y. Strategic thinking would ask about 
metaproblems, such as—
• What would an invasion gain for us?
• How long would this gain last?
• Would it be worth the cost to invade Country Y?
• Is there a better alternative such as bombing or 
letting a partner take action?
• What might be the unintended consequences of 
invading?
• What would happen after the invasion?
• How would invading qualitatively change our 
situation?
Quantitative analysis can inform this deci-
sion-making process, but quantitative analysis still 
depends on making subjective judgments about what 
constitutes success. Every measure of effectiveness 
requires a standard to be established against which ac-
tions will be measured. Do you measure if a military 
action is worth the cost in terms of causalities, money, 
or both? Does worth the cost mean achieving territorial 
or political gains? Could the action in question simply 
be a moral imperative and thus be outside the stan-
dard cost-benefit discourse? That is, even when strat-
egists use quantitative methods, they must be aware 
that they reflect a value judgment from a subjective 
perspective—that of their bosses, themselves, the en-
emy command, the enemy population, and so on. In 
military planning, even the standards used in quanti-
tative analysis need to be framed from the perspective 
of the key actors in the conflict.
What is the Context?
Every measure, quantitative or qualitative, should 
be interpreted in context. By their nature, qualitative 
measurements presuppose the kind of theoretical 
frameworks essential for strategic thought (a theory 
must exist to justify the measure). Though qualitative 
methods certainly can be used to generate quantita-
tive-looking measures of effectiveness, categorizing 
focus-group information into numerical scores, for 
instance, would require an explicit causal framework 
as a basis for the categorization. Since there would be 
many different contexts for causal frameworks—na-
tional culture, the professional cultures of the mil-
itary services or the government, or the view from 
partner nations—no single result would be definitive. 
Moreover, time as a variable would complicate the 
articulation of context. Thinking in terms of the 
interrelated nature of variables across time is thinking 
about context.
One of the biggest challenges to implementing 
the strategic landpower concept will be embracing 
qualitative analysis. The culture of the U.S. Army 
still tends to discount its value. Army commanders’ 
institutional norms enable a can do attitude based on 
an institution-wide overconfidence in the ability of 
analytical methods to provide understanding of cause 
and effect. However, the idea that the quantitative 
scientific methods with which Army professionals are 
comfortable will be adequate for strategic landpower 
undermines real strategic thought by upholding the 
false objectivity of quantitative measures.
Operations are, and always have been, too com-
plex to reduce to supposed scientific analyses. Even if 
politics and warfare were hard sciences, the reliable 
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quantitative basis for military decisions, strategic or 
tactical, would be very limited. Politics and warfare 
are not hard sciences: Afghanistan is a prime example.
Why Does Qualitative 
Analysis Matter?
The qualitative approach is central to under-
standing how people are the same and how they 
differ. Differences are not easy to understand. 
People, and the formal and informal institutions in 
which they aggregate, project what they know into 
assumed equations about how the world works. In 
this way, they form generalized causal theories about 
international relations and the political views that 
other people and countries hold.15 In other words, 
one group of people assumes certain values guide 
the behavior of another group. In strategic thought, 
we must recognize that such projections are just 
that—projections.
In one sense, the qualitative approach differs 
from the quantitative because it asks framing ques-
tions—the holistic “why” and “what does it mean” 
questions leading to understanding the big picture, 
such as “How has the security ecosystem changed 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union?” or “What 
will the drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan 
mean to the incumbent government?” In another 
sense, the qualitative approach differs because the 
data-gathering methods cannot escape the prob-
lem of subjective interpretation. Any textual data 
obtained requires a human researcher to categorize 
it using subjective criteria.
Strategic thinking should not be imagined simply 
as a way to solve problems. Strategic thinking is a 
way to search for answers to big-picture questions. 
These answers can help guide activities at almost 
any level of the organization. A study of the poten-
tial effects of a major change in Afghanistan, such 
as the drawdown of U.S. forces, needs a qualitative 
approach. Strategic thinkers will develop questions 
that include context. A decontextualized question 
would have narrow boundaries: What will a U.S. 
drawdown of forces in Afghanistan mean to U.S. 
security? Questions that account for context would 
include the key people:
• What will a drawdown mean to the Karzai 
government?
• What does Karzai himself think about this?
• What words does he use to describe his feelings 
about this event?
• Does his language show he fears for his job or his 
life, or does he see a drawdown as an opportunity to 
consolidate or expand his power?
In other words, what does the objective description 
of Karzai’s subjective response reveal?
Qualitative study develops a collected and collated 
description of these kinds of subjective experiences—of 
one man, of select branches in the government, or of 
swaths of the population. Categorizing opinion sur-
veys, interviews, speeches, or economic data will help 
researchers construct a tentative picture of the strategic 
implications of the drawdown. The point is to esti-
mate the range of possible futures and then to examine 
which policies and which actions most likely would 
leave the United States in the best position. To return 
to Gen. Dempsey, the facts mean little without context.
The qualitative approach puts the facts into context. 
That this requires subjective choices on the part of 
qualitative or strategic thinkers is not a weakness. The 
significance of a qualitative approach is not necessarily 
in its predictive capability but in how it helps decision 
makers ask and study the right questions in the right 
way. Thinking strategically is thinking through ques-
tions of context over time. The number of armored 
vehicles in the Afghan National Army or even the 
number of soldiers who passed basic training will not 
tell us much about what we really want to know: is the 
Afghan National Army now of high enough quali-
ty—in many different senses of the word—to do its job 
effectively?
Policy makers and military professionals need to 
understand why people behave as they do because 
the strategic goals that military operations support 
involve changing human behavior. Human behavior 
is a product of what people think and feel and believe. 
Numerical measurements can indicate how many peo-
ple feel or think or believe certain ways, but they can-
not explain why. Strategic thinking is about answering 
those why questions. Ideally, we need to find answers 
not based our worldview about Islam or Vladimir 
Putin or even about democracy. What matters is to 
understand how our enemies see their own actions as 
rational, and a qualitative approach is the only means 
of study to achieve that.
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What is the Solution?
The Army must learn how to adopt genuine 
strategic thought. It will need to figure out how to 
apply strategic thinking in institutional and opera-
tional settings and at different echelons. It will need to 
determine ways to use strategic thinking to enhance 
time-constrained decision making during operations as 
well as to develop strategic policy guidance as part of 
the professional requirement to give advice to civilian 
leaders. Army senior leaders will apply strategic think-
ing differently than mid-level commanders, staffs, or 
soldiers on the ground.
The Army already has a good start on some ini-
tiatives that will improve its ability to use qualitative 
analysis. One example is improving cultural aware-
ness through regionally aligned forces. The Army can 
further improve its use of qualitative analysis in three 
broad ways:
• Encouraging deep familiarity with the social science 
theories and debates that drive policy making by sending 
more officers to top-rated university doctoral programs,
• Increasing the emphasis on teaching the Army de-
sign methodology in professional military education, and
• Encouraging questioning during educational 
experiences and during staff planning.
The future is filled with complex political-military 
conflicts. Only an Army culture steeped in the ethos of 
strategic thinking and the qualitative approach that 
supports it will succeed in connecting military victory 
to long-term strategic success. This was the tradition of 
the Army at its finest, under Washington, Grant, 
Marshall, and Eisenhower—who were among the finest 
strategic and qualitative thinkers of their time. The 
conflicts of the 21st century will demand the same of 
today’s Army. There is no reason that challenge cannot 
be met and every reason it must be.
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